Week 43 · 10 Oct – 20 Oct 2026 · 45 items reviewed

All eight exploited items these two weeks are in CISA KEV

Forty-five items came through over these two weeks, from twelve publishers. Eight carried published exploitation, and every one of those eight is listed in CISA KEV. Five further items touch Microsoft 365, with no exploitation published for any of them.

Every item these two weeks in ranking order: exploited, touches Microsoft 365, everything else; a ring marks CISA KEV.

Start here

The 5 the ranking puts first. Exploitation evidence outranks a higher score without it; a Microsoft 365 match outranks everything else.

  1. Ahsay AhsayCBS Command Injection Vulnerability

    A remote attacker can run operating system commands through the Replication Receiver endpoint and gets a shell as the service account, so the real question is what that account was quietly allowed to reach, and the publisher notes it can be chained with a second flaw.

    Apply the v10.3.4.45 hotfix on AhsayCBS v10 servers or the v9.15.2.70 hotfix on v7, v8 and v9 servers from the partner portal, reboot after installing, and do not treat the earlier v9.15.2.59 or v10.3.4.0 patches as sufficient.

    In CISA KEVOfficial advisorycisa.govscore 10.0 Command injection · full reading and source

    In the CISA KEV catalogue, so exploitation is not hypothetical. US federal agencies get a binding deadline for these; everyone else gets a strong hint.

    Mitigation

    Patch available

    Fixed in:

    1. On AhsayCBS v10 servers, apply the v10.3.4.45 hotfix from the partner portal. www.ahsay.com
    2. On AhsayCBS v7, v8 or v9 servers, apply the v9.15.2.70 hotfix from the partner portal. www.ahsay.com
    3. Reboot the server once the hotfix is installed. www.ahsay.com
    4. Do not treat the earlier v9.15.2.59 or v10.3.4.0 patches as sufficient protection. www.ahsay.com

    Steps extracted by AI from the linked pages; each links to the page that says so. Confirm there before acting.

    From CISA KEV:

    Required action. Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.

    US federal remediation deadline: 17 October 2026.

    Where we looked (5)

    General notes on command injection, the same for every item of this class:

    What this class puts at risk

    Whoever reaches the service gets a shell as the service account. The vulnerability is rarely the interesting part — what that account was quietly allowed to reach is.

    General practice

    Patch, then rotate what the service held. Treat those credentials as spent, not merely exposed.

    Publisher text. Ahsay AhsayCBS contains a command injection vulnerability that could allow a remote attacker to execute operating system commands via manipulation of the random parameter in the Replication Receiver component’s /rps/api/json/UpdateReceivers.do endpoint This vulnerability can be chained with CVE-2026-105133.

    Read the original at cisa.gov CVE record

    Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

  2. Cisco Secure Email Gateway Relative Path Traversal Vulnerability

    An unauthenticated, remote attacker can write arbitrary files on the underlying operating system of the appliance that handles your mail, and file access of that kind goes after configuration and private keys rather than anything harmless.

    Update the Content Scanner Tools package to 25.3.0.5525 or later, upgrade AsyncOS to 15.5.5-014 or 16.5.0-780 and migrate off release 16.0, review system logs on every device and cluster member for the listed compromise indicators, contact Cisco TAC if one appears or a scan did not complete, and cross-check network and firewall logs for unexpected uploads or downloads.

    In CISA KEVOfficial advisorycisa.govscore 9.8 Path traversal · full reading and source

    In the CISA KEV catalogue, so exploitation is not hypothetical. US federal agencies get a binding deadline for these; everyone else gets a strong hint.

    Mitigation

    Patch available

    Fixed in:

    1. Update the Content Scanner Tools package to version 25.3.0.5525 or later, which needs no upgrade or restart. sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
    2. Upgrade Cisco AsyncOS to 15.5.5-014 or 16.5.0-780, migrating off release 16.0. sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
    3. Review the system logs of every device, including each cluster member, for the listed compromise indicator messages. sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
    4. Contact Cisco TAC if a suspected compromise indicator is found or the security scan did not complete. sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
    5. Cross-check network and firewall logs outside the appliance for unexpected uploads or downloads. sec.cloudapps.cisco.com

    Steps extracted by AI from the linked pages; each links to the page that says so. Confirm there before acting.

    From CISA KEV:

    Required action. Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.

    US federal remediation deadline: 17 October 2026.

    Where we looked (2)

    General notes on path traversal, the same for every item of this class:

    What this class puts at risk

    Arbitrary file read outside the intended directory, sometimes write. Nobody traverses a directory to fetch your logo; they go for configuration files and private keys.

    General practice

    Patch, then rotate every secret stored in a file that process could open.

    Publisher text. Cisco Secure Email Gateway contains a relative path traversal vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to write arbitrary files on the underlying operating system Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable

    Read the original at cisa.gov CVE record

    Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

  3. BeyondTrust Remote Support Authentication Bypass by Spoofing Vulnerability

    A remote attacker can spoof their way past authentication and perform file operations on the appliance, and access logs that assume an identity may simply not have recorded the activity you would look for.

    Patch, and treat the whole window as unauthenticated exposure: ask what those endpoints returned, not only whether they were reachable.

    In CISA KEVOfficial advisorycisa.govscore 9.8 Authentication bypass · full reading and source

    In the CISA KEV catalogue, so exploitation is not hypothetical. US federal agencies get a binding deadline for these; everyone else gets a strong hint.

    Mitigation

    From CISA KEV:

    Required action. Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.

    US federal remediation deadline: 19 October 2026.

    Where we looked (3)

    General notes on authentication bypass, the same for every item of this class:

    What this class puts at risk

    Functions built for signed-in users, reachable by anyone. The harder problem is downstream: access logs that assume an identity may simply not have recorded the activity you are looking for.

    General practice

    Patch, and treat the whole window as unauthenticated exposure. Ask what those endpoints returned, not only whether they were reachable.

    Publisher text. BeyondTrust Remote Support contains an authentication bypass by spoofing vulnerability that could allow a remote attacker to perform file operations on the appliance Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable

    Read the original at cisa.gov CVE record

    Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

  4. Microsoft Windows Command Injection Vulnerability

    An unauthorized attacker can bypass a security feature over the network through Windows Shell, which puts the control you were relying on out of the picture on ordinary user machines.

    Follow BOD 26-04 guidance on prioritizing security updates based on risk, including its forensics triage requirements.

    In CISA KEVOfficial advisorycisa.govscore 8.8 Command injection · full reading and source

    In the CISA KEV catalogue, so exploitation is not hypothetical. US federal agencies get a binding deadline for these; everyone else gets a strong hint.

    Mitigation

    No fix found in the pages we could read

    From CISA KEV:

    BOD 26-04: BOD 26-04: Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk | CISA

    Forensics Triage Requirements: BOD 26-04: Implementation Guidance for Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk | CISA

    Required action. Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.

    US federal remediation deadline: 16 October 2026.

    Where we looked (3)

    General notes on command injection, the same for every item of this class:

    What this class puts at risk

    Whoever reaches the service gets a shell as the service account. The vulnerability is rarely the interesting part — what that account was quietly allowed to reach is.

    General practice

    Patch, then rotate what the service held. Treat those credentials as spent, not merely exposed.

    Publisher text. Microsoft Windows Shell contains a command injection vulnerability that allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable

    Read the original at cisa.gov CVE record

    Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

  5. Ivanti Connect Secure Authentication Bypass by Spoofing Vulnerability

    A remote, unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands, which means functions built for signed-in users are reachable by anyone for as long as the appliance is unpatched.

    Apply the fix described in Ivanti's security advisory for CVE-2026-104935.

    In CISA KEVOfficial advisory2 publisherscisa.govscore 8.6 Authentication bypass · full reading and source

    In the CISA KEV catalogue, so exploitation is not hypothetical. US federal agencies get a binding deadline for these; everyone else gets a strong hint.

    Mitigation

    No fix found in the pages we could read

    From CISA KEV:

    https:/forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-CVE-2026-104935

    Required action. Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.

    US federal remediation deadline: 16 October 2026.

    Where we looked (2)

    General notes on authentication bypass, the same for every item of this class:

    What this class puts at risk

    Functions built for signed-in users, reachable by anyone. The harder problem is downstream: access logs that assume an identity may simply not have recorded the activity you are looking for.

    General practice

    Patch, and treat the whole window as unauthenticated exposure. Ask what those endpoints returned, not only whether they were reachable.

    Publisher text. Ivanti Connect Secure contains an authentication bypass by spoofing vulnerability that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable

    Read the original at cisa.gov

    Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

The pattern

Authentication bypass was the most common class across these two weeks: 3 of 14 classified items, including the BeyondTrust and Ivanti entries under start here. It fits what the exploited set looks like too, where 2 of the 8 items were access-control failures rather than memory safety. Those reward an attacker with no skill and no exploit development, which is why they get used quickly. When one class repeats like this it is usually worth checking whether your own estate has the same shape of exposure, not just the named product.

  • 2 of 8 exploited items are access-control failures. Authentication, authorization, or credential handling — not memory safety. These reward an attacker with no skill and no exploit development, which is why they get used quickly.
  • 17 CVEs here are reported by a single publisher. Single-source does not mean wrong, it means unconfirmed. Corroboration on this page requires two independent publisher domains naming the same CVE, and most items do not have it yet.

Worth a read

Pieces from the week that are not advisories: managed Microsoft 365 posture, agentic coding, and the occasional essay.

Everything else these two weeks

Triage order, not severity order. Opening an item shows what its class puts at risk, what to do, the publisher text, and the link.

Exploited elsewhere

3
7.5CVE-2026-21589 cisa.gov 2026-10-15 Atlassian Multiple Products Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties Vulnerability Multiple Atlassian products (Bitbucket Data Center ,Confluence Data Center, Jira Service Management Data Center, Jira Software Data Center, Bamboo Data Center, Crowd Data Center, Crucible and Fisheye) contain a files or directories accessible to external parties vulnerability which could allow an unauthenticated… In CISA KEVOfficial advisory3 publishers Detail and source

In the CISA KEV catalogue, so exploitation is not hypothetical. US federal agencies get a binding deadline for these; everyone else gets a strong hint.

Mitigation

Patch available

Fixed in:

  1. Upgrade every affected Atlassian Data Center, Crucible and Fisheye installation to a listed fixed version immediately. confluence.atlassian.com
  2. If you cannot patch yet, take the instance off the internet and block external network access. confluence.atlassian.com
  3. Add the published path-traversal regex rule to your web application firewall or proxy layer and verify it blocks the encoded variants. confluence.atlassian.com
  4. For Confluence, Jira, Jira Service Management, Bamboo and Crowd, back up the instance then enable Tomcat's RewriteValve with the supplied rewrite.config on each node. confluence.atlassian.com
  5. For Bitbucket, add the blocking rule to the top of app/WEB-INF/urlrewrite.xml on all nodes and mirrors. jira.atlassian.com

Steps extracted by AI from the linked pages; each links to the page that says so. Confirm there before acting.

From CISA KEV:

Required action. Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.

US federal remediation deadline: 18 October 2026.

Where we looked (11)

Publisher text. Multiple Atlassian products (Bitbucket Data Center ,Confluence Data Center, Jira Service Management Data Center, Jira Software Data Center, Bamboo Data Center, Crowd Data Center, Crucible and Fisheye) contain a files or directories accessible to external parties vulnerability which could allow an unauthenticated attacker to access specific files within the web application root directory in affected versions

Read the original at cisa.gov CVE record

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

7.2CVE-2026-0322 cisa.gov 2026-10-14 Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS Code Injection Vulnerability Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS contains a code injection vulnerability that could allow an authenticated attacker with network access to execute arbitrary code with root privileges on the firewall Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable In CISA KEVOfficial advisory Code injection · exposure, response and source

In the CISA KEV catalogue, so exploitation is not hypothetical. US federal agencies get a binding deadline for these; everyone else gets a strong hint.

Mitigation

Patch available

Fixed in:

  1. Upgrade PAN-OS to the fixed release for your branch as soon as possible. security.paloaltonetworks.com
  2. Block internet access to the management interface and allow it only from a single jump box. security.paloaltonetworks.com
  3. If you have Threat Prevention, enable Threat IDs 510046 and 510047 with content version 9159-10287 or later. security.paloaltonetworks.com
  4. Route management traffic through a data-plane port and decrypt it so those signatures can inspect it. security.paloaltonetworks.com
  5. Search your logs for the published attacker IP addresses to check for exploitation attempts. security.paloaltonetworks.com

Steps extracted by AI from the linked pages; each links to the page that says so. Confirm there before acting.

From CISA KEV:

Required action. Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.

US federal remediation deadline: 17 October 2026.

Where we looked (2)

General notes on code injection, the same for every item of this class:

What this class puts at risk

Attacker code running inside the application's own trust context, inheriting its database access, its service accounts, and every integration it holds a token for.

General practice

Patch and rotate application secrets. Enumerate what the application can authenticate to — that list is the blast radius.

Publisher text. Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS contains a code injection vulnerability that could allow an authenticated attacker with network access to execute arbitrary code with root privileges on the firewall Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable

Read the original at cisa.gov CVE record

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

7.0CVE-2025-61624 cisa.gov 2026-10-16 Fortinet Multiple Products Path Traversal Vulnerability FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy, and FortiSwitchManager contain a path traversal vulnerability that may allow an authenticated attacker with admin profile and at least read-write permissions to write or delete arbitrary files via specific CLI commands. Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or… In CISA KEVOfficial advisory Path traversal · exposure, response and source

In the CISA KEV catalogue, so exploitation is not hypothetical. US federal agencies get a binding deadline for these; everyone else gets a strong hint.

Mitigation

Patch available

Fixed in:

  1. Update FortiGate NGFW to version 7.4.10 or later. cert-portal.siemens.com
  2. On RUGGEDCOM APE1808 devices, update to the latest version released by Siemens. cert-portal.siemens.com
  3. Audit FortiOS configuration revisions for auto-script objects whose names contain path traversal sequences. unit42.paloaltonetworks.com
  4. Inspect the memory maps of the miglogd and iked daemons for anonymous 16 KB read-write-execute regions. unit42.paloaltonetworks.com
  5. Review the device crashlog for segmentation faults involving miglogd, iked or syslogd. unit42.paloaltonetworks.com

Steps extracted by AI from the linked pages; each links to the page that says so. Confirm there before acting.

From CISA KEV:

Required action. Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.

US federal remediation deadline: 19 October 2026.

Where we looked (4)

General notes on path traversal, the same for every item of this class:

What this class puts at risk

Arbitrary file read outside the intended directory, sometimes write. Nobody traverses a directory to fetch your logo; they go for configuration files and private keys.

General practice

Patch, then rotate every secret stored in a file that process could open.

Publisher text. FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy, and FortiSwitchManager contain a path traversal vulnerability that may allow an authenticated attacker with admin profile and at least read-write permissions to write or delete arbitrary files via specific CLI commands. Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable.

Read the original at cisa.gov CVE record

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

Touches Microsoft 365, no exploitation published

5
3.8 thehackernews.com 2026-10-17 Hackers Use Compromised ConnectWise Credential to Sign In to 173 Microsoft 365 Tenants Cybersecurity researchers are sounding the alarm related to an active campaign in which unknown threat actors are abusing a compromised Microsoft 365 (M365) credential belonging to ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick) to gain unauthorized access to customers' M365 environments. ConnectWise Cloud Backup is a… Entra IDDefenderIntuneExchangeTeams / SharePointEstablished reporting Detail and source

Applicable to Entra ID, Defender, Intune, Exchange, Teams / SharePoint. Nobody has published exploitation yet, so this belongs in the next planned change window rather than tonight.

Mitigation

The source published no mitigation steps with this item, and none were found in the pages we could read (no advisory links were listed for it). Check the linked advisory for fixed versions and workarounds before acting.

Publisher text. Cybersecurity researchers are sounding the alarm related to an active campaign in which unknown threat actors are abusing a compromised Microsoft 365 (M365) credential belonging to ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick) to gain unauthorized access to customers' M365 environments. ConnectWise Cloud Backup is a cloud-based backup and recovery service built for managed service providers (MSPs

Read the original at thehackernews.com

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

3.8 thehackernews.com 2026-10-18 ConnectWise Suspends Cloud Backup After Attackers Compromise Microsoft 365 Tenants ConnectWise on Saturday said it has disabled seven ConnectWise application identities as it continues its investigation into an incident in which unknown threat actors obtained unauthorized access to the application identities and compromised Microsoft 365 tenants. The disabled identities are listed below -… Entra IDDefenderIntuneExchangeTeams / SharePointEstablished reporting Detail and source

Applicable to Entra ID, Defender, Intune, Exchange, Teams / SharePoint. Nobody has published exploitation yet, so this belongs in the next planned change window rather than tonight.

Mitigation

The source published no mitigation steps with this item, and none were found in the pages we could read (no advisory links were listed for it). Check the linked advisory for fixed versions and workarounds before acting.

Publisher text. ConnectWise on Saturday said it has disabled seven ConnectWise application identities as it continues its investigation into an incident in which unknown threat actors obtained unauthorized access to the application identities and compromised Microsoft 365 tenants. The disabled identities are listed below - ConnectWise Cloud Backup - 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae ConnectWise

Read the original at thehackernews.com

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

3.8 bleepingcomputer.com 2026-10-19 Microsoft: October Windows Server updates break Exchange sign-in, mail flow Microsoft has confirmed that this month's Windows Server security updates are causing OWA sign-in and mail delivery issues on some Exchange Server systems. [...] ExchangeEstablished reporting Detail and source

Applicable to Exchange. Nobody has published exploitation yet, so this belongs in the next planned change window rather than tonight.

Mitigation

The source published no mitigation steps with this item, and none were found in the pages we could read (no advisory links were listed for it). Check the linked advisory for fixed versions and workarounds before acting.

Publisher text. Microsoft has confirmed that this month's Windows Server security updates are causing OWA sign-in and mail delivery issues on some Exchange Server systems. [...]

Read the original at bleepingcomputer.com

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

3.0 github.blog 2026-10-16 Multi-repository support and other improvements for GitHub in Slack and Teams @GitHub in Slack and Teams now supports working across multiple repositories in a single conversation. Whether you’re creating issues, opening pull requests, or investigating bugs, you can work across repositories without switching conversations. For example, you can ask @GitHub to: Create issues from… Teams / SharePointEstablished reporting Detail and source

Applicable to Teams / SharePoint. Nobody has published exploitation yet, so this belongs in the next planned change window rather than tonight.

Mitigation

The source published no mitigation steps with this item, and none were found in the pages we could read (no advisory links were listed for it). Check the linked advisory for fixed versions and workarounds before acting.

Publisher text. @GitHub in Slack and Teams now supports working across multiple repositories in a single conversation. Whether you’re creating issues, opening pull requests, or investigating bugs, you can work across repositories without switching conversations. For example, you can ask @GitHub to: Create issues from conversations: “@GitHub Create an issue in github/issues to track this bug, using the context from this thread.” Make code changes: “@GitHub Fix this bug in our frontend repository and open a PR with the changes.” Track your PRs: “@GitHub Show me all my open PRs across repositories and highlight which ones need my attention.” Investigate bugs: “@GitHub Investigate this issue using the code in our frontend and backend repositories.” You can do all of this directly from Slack or Teams, without switching repositories or starting a new conversation. Additional improvements We’ve also made several improvements to GitHub in Slack and Microsoft Teams: More natural conversations: Mention @GitHub anywhere in your message, not just at the beginning. Smoother repository switching: Move between repositories more easily during a conversation. Better Slack conversation context: @GitHub can use shared Slack messages and threads as context, making it easier to reference discussions without copying and pasting details. Improved reliability: We’ve made several improvements to reduce errors, improve task startup, and help @GitHub recover more smoothly from interruptions in Slack and Teams. Join the discussion within the GitHub Community. The post Multi-repository support and other improvements for GitHub in Slack and Teams appeared first on The GitHub Blog.

Read the original at github.blog

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

3.0 microsoft.com 2026-10-16 Managing open-weight model risk in enterprise deployments The growing AI landscape is giving enterprises more choice in how they build, customize, and deploy increasingly capable models. Open-weight models are an important part of that landscape. They give enterprises access to model weights and greater flexibility to inspect, evaluate, modify, and run models within their… Teams / SharePointVendor research Detail and source

Applicable to Teams / SharePoint. Nobody has published exploitation yet, so this belongs in the next planned change window rather than tonight.

Mitigation

The source published no mitigation steps with this item, and none were found in the pages we could read (no advisory links were listed for it). Check the linked advisory for fixed versions and workarounds before acting.

Publisher text. The growing AI landscape is giving enterprises more choice in how they build, customize, and deploy increasingly capable models. Open-weight models are an important part of that landscape. They give enterprises access to model weights and greater flexibility to inspect, evaluate, modify, and run models within their own environments. While that flexibility can be valuable, it also affects how enterprises evaluate models, where they implement safeguards, and who is responsible for maintaining those safeguards over time. As enterprises choose which models to deploy, the relevant question is broader than whether a model is open-weight or closed-weight. Enterprises need to understand what they are using the model for, what could go wrong in that context, and what evidence and controls they need to manage risks. Today, Microsoft and NVIDIA are publishing Risk Management for Open-Weight Models in Enterprise, the first in a planned series of joint resources intended to help enterprises address those questions. The paper introduces a shared risk taxonomy and an approach to managing model risks grounded in established standards and frameworks, including International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) AI Risk Management Framework. The paper reflects a core idea: weight openness alone does not determine an AI system’s risk. Risk depends on the model, use case, deployment, and safeguards. Read the whitepaper: Risk Management for Open-Weight Models in Enterprise Understanding risk in the deployment context Open- and closed-weight models can share many of the same underlying risks, but how those risks materialize depends on the deployment. A model used to help an employee draft a document presents different considerations than the same model used in a customer-facing workflow, just as a standalone inference endpoint differs from a system connected to external data or tools. The architecture matters too. A risk may originate in the model, while the most effective control may sit in the inference environment, application, or surrounding operational processes. The joint guidance looks beyond the model label to factors including provenance, intended use, users, deployment conditions, and surrounding controls. This first paper focuses primarily on model-layer risks. Evaluating a model alone does not establish the safety of an agent or application: teams must also assess its permissions, data access, tools, runtime, and operational controls. Establishing a common language Managing these risks consistently also requires a common vocabulary across engineering, security, legal, safety, and business teams. The initial Microsoft and NVIDIA taxonomy organizes risks into five broad categories: Cybersecurity, Data Protection, Content, Human-AI Interaction, and Bias. It is not a policy or deployment checklist, but instead it should be used by enterprises to adapt it to their own systems, use cases, and risk criteria, then connect relevant risks to evaluations, mitigations, and accountable owners. Using evaluations as risk evidence Evaluations help turn the taxonomy into something enterprises can use. The paper maps evaluations to a selection of risks across the five categories, giving teams a way to start with a risk that matters for their deployment and identify evaluations that can produce relevant evidence about it. Microsoft Foundry helps enterprises assess quality, groundedness, and safety with built-in and custom evaluations and automated red teaming. Its configurable content-safety controls help detect and mitigate harmful inputs and outputs and prompt attacks. Teams should validate control availability for their model and deployment, including preview status, and combine these capabilities with application-specific testing, monitoring, and human oversight. Evaluations still need to be interpreted in the context of a particular deployment and the goal is to make it easier for teams to connect the risks they identify with useful evidence, while building a broader

Read the original at microsoft.com

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

Also reviewed

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