Exploited flaw lets unauthenticated attackers run code on self-managed GitLab servers

Applicable to Entra ID, Defender, Intune, Exchange, Teams / SharePoint. Nobody has published exploitation yet, so this belongs in the next planned change window rather than tonight.

Publisher text. The Good | Courts Sentence Tax Fraudster, Interpol Disrupts African Cybercrime, and Ex-AI Engineer Faces Wiretapping ChargesA U.S. district court has sentenced Nigerian national Chukwuemeka Victor Amachukwu to eight years in prison for conducting spearphishing attacks against tax preparation firms. Following his extradition, Amachukwu has pleaded guilty to computer intrusion and wire fraud charges.Between 2019 and 2021, he and his co-conspirators breached accounting networks across multiple U.S. states, compromising the tax and personally identifiable information (PII) of at least 800 clients. They also filed fraudulent tax returns and disaster loan applications, stealing over $3.3 million. The court sentenced Amachukwu to one year of supervised release and ordered him to pay $3.6 million in restitution and forfeit nearly $11 million.Also this week, Interpol coordinated Operation Serengeti III alongside 21 countries and private-sector partners to disrupt cybercrime networks across Africa, with crimes ranging from business email compromise (BEC) to various scams. Executed between June and August 2026, the joint crackdown resulted in 1,462 arrests, the dismantling of 10,909 malicious infrastructures, and the recovery of more than $105 million in illicit proceeds. In total, the investigation identified 65,929 victims with losses estimated to be over $385 million. Finally, a U.S. judge has ordered the detention of former OpenAI engineer Abdulrahman Alfozan for alleged corporate espionage at the company's San Francisco office. Prosecutors revealed that the Saudi national installed customized, encrypted audio recording devices in executive conference rooms in hopes of capturing sensitive corporate conversations. Investigation filings exposed frequent encrypted communications between Alfozan and a Saudi Royal Family member, seeking to recruit him for a state AI initiative. Federal agents arrested Alfozan just days prior to his scheduled one-way flight to Saudi Arabia and now he faces a maximum of five years in prison if convicted.The Bad | China-Linked Actor Deploys Agentic AI in Cloud Supply Chain AttacksA suspected Chinese-state aligned threat actor has leveraged an agentic AI framework to execute a supply chain compromise against ConnectWise Cloud Backup, automating attacks across hundreds of global organizations. Active since at least 2021 and historically reliant on botnet infrastructure for evasive password spraying, the group was seen using ARTEX, a Go-based, multi-agent LLM penetration testing system, to conduct offensive operations at machine speed. By deploying AI agents configured to work around the clock, the threat actors drastically reduced the time from initial targeting to achieving privileged cloud access to under three hours in multiple targeted environments.The actor leveraged ARTEX to automate scanning, reconnaissance, password spraying, and OAuth application abuse across a broad range of sectors, including aerospace, defense, energy, financial services, government, and technology. Between October 10 and October 14, 2026, the attackers launched an automated cross-tenant password-spray campaign from dedicated infrastructure, generating over 151,000 failed logon events that peaked on October 11 at 2,900 failures per minute. Then on October 15, the AI agents acquired control of identities associated with multiple ConnectWise cloud applications, using pre-granted permissions to authenticate to downstream Microsoft 365 customer environments without requiring interactive user logins.Once authenticated, the agents ran Microsoft Graph operations to perform directory reconnaissance, alter privileged roles, and modify application credentials. By adding unauthorized credentials to existing OAuth applications, the AI agents established persistent backdoors that remain active even after remediating the primary backup software. The campaign saw ARTEX attempt sign-ins across more than 2,250 tenants, narrowing the response window. In response to the intrusion, ConnectWise has temporarily suspended services to isolate infras

Read the original at sentinelone.com

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

Applicable to Entra ID, Defender, Intune. Nobody has published exploitation yet, so this belongs in the next planned change window rather than tonight.

Publisher text. Microsoft has been named a Leader in the inaugural 2026 Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for AI Agent Management Platforms. We believe this recognition reflects Microsoft’s approach to helping organizations manage, secure, and scale their AI investments through Microsoft Agent 365. Figure 1: Gartner, Magic Quadrant for AI Agent Management Platforms, October 27, 2026. Monitor and manage agents with Microsoft Agent 365 When we introduced Agent 365, we started with a simple concept: agents should be managed with the same rigor you already apply to users, apps, and devices, using the infrastructure and protections that already run your business. Since then, more than 50 million agents have been registered in Agent 365.1 Here’s what we believe made the difference. We started with identity, not monitoring Many approaches to managing agents focus on monitoring after an agent is running. Microsoft’s approach begins with identity. With Microsoft Entra Agent ID, every agent in the organization is assigned a unique agent ID, associated with an owner and purpose, and the right access controls based on its needs. This enables organizations to apply established identity and access policies to both people and agents. Agent access policies are dynamically adjusted as risk signals and conditions change. Organizations can manage agent access through the Microsoft identity infrastructure they already use for their workforce. We built on what you already trust Rather than building a separate platform, Agent 365 extends the tools IT and security teams already use every day: Microsoft Entra, Microsoft Defender, Microsoft Purview, Microsoft Intune, and the Microsoft 365 admin center. That decision shapes the experience. Microsoft data protection, compliance, and security capabilities can help organizations extend familiar controls to supported agent scenarios.2 We meet agents where they are Agents won’t come from one platform, so Agent 365 is designed to support a broad ecosystem. It brings supported agents from Microsoft, customer-built agents, local agents found on devices, and partner clouds and frameworks into one registry. Current integrations include Agentforce, Amazon Bedrock, Anthropic, Databricks, Google Gemini, and Google Vertex, with more planned integrations coming soon, including OpenAI, ServiceNow, and Snowflake. Agent 365 also integrates agents built using supported open-source frameworks with the Agent 365 software development kit (SDK). For additional agent patterns, including local and previously unknown agents discovered through Microsoft Security sensors, Agent 365 supports fit-for-purpose identity types so they can be represented in the registry with appropriate ownership, activity, and risk context. Microsoft is also previewing discovery of cloud agents, extending visibility beyond known and integrated agents. Together, native integrations, connectors, and security sensors help organizations discover and govern more of their agent estate across cloud and device environments. There’s more to do Agent 365 moved quickly from introduction to general availability, and we haven’t slowed down. We’re proud of this recognition, and we know there’s more work ahead. We are expanding discovery to 35 additional local agent types, bringing the total to 60, along with adding support to discover unknown agents, bringing these agents under management, as well as extending policy coverage and controls for both managed and unmanaged agents, including third-party agents. But, visibility and controls are only the beginning. Customers have asked for more automated support for agent governance and security. The new Agent 365 Action Center helps IT and security leaders move from reactive alerts to prescriptive actions, like cleaning up inactive agents, reassigning ownerless agents, or automatically blocking agents based on risk. We’re also advancing cost management, task classification, and value calculation to help organizations understand how agents are being used, what they cost, and the value they deliver. Our promise hasn’t change

Read the original at microsoft.com

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

Applicable to Defender. Nobody has published exploitation yet, so this belongs in the next planned change window rather than tonight.

Publisher text. Microsoft Threat Intelligence has identified an evolving fake-download campaign targeting users searching for cracked commercial software, free games, activators, plugins, and unofficial utilities. The campaign uses trojanized Inno Setup-style installers to distribute multiple monetized software payloads, referred to by the delivery system as “offers”, during a single installation session. Our investigation found that the installers use a per-offer callback and status-tracking model to manage delivery and record installation outcomes. We confirmed three downstream monetization branches that transformed affected devices into monetized assets, including by routing third-party internet traffic through the device, enrolling it in a distributed-computing platform, or installing additional utility-style software, often without users’ informed knowledge or consent. These products and components may have legitimate uses, but their silent installation through deceptive software bundles without informed user consent introduces security and privacy risks. Organizations can reduce their exposure to this activity by preventing the use of untrusted software sources, enabling potentially unwanted application protection, and monitoring for unexpected software installations and persistence mechanisms. This blog details the campaign’s execution model and confirmed outcomes and provides mitigation guidance, Microsoft Defender protection information, advanced hunting queries, MITRE ATT&CK mappings, and indicators of compromise to help defenders identify, investigate, and respond to related activity. Attack chain overview The fake-download campaign follows a four-stage attack chain that progresses from deceptive lures through Inno-based staging, offer-controlled payload delivery, and installation of one or more monetization branches: Initial access via fake download lures – Users run fake installers promoted as cracked commercial software, free games, activators, plugins, executors, or unofficial utilities. Inno wrapper execution and temporary runner staging – The installer launches an Inno Setup-style temporary runner under %TEMP%\is-*.tmp\, which starts recurring eld*.exe, set_*.exe, or other numbered stages. Offer execution callback and payload delivery – The runner contacts rotating infrastructure using a repeatable d=inno and r=offer_execution callback pattern. Offer, affiliate, download-network, placement, and session values coordinate downstream payload selection and correlate activity within the installer session. Final payload installation and monetization – Staged payloads use unattended installation switches to install one or more confirmed campaign branches: WorldProxyPool for proxy and network-resource monetization; CharityEngine and Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing (BOINC) for compute-resource monetization; or Advanced Windows (AW) Manager and Windows Manager for adware-style utility monetization. WorldProxyPool also creates recurring SYSTEM scheduled tasks for agent startup, watchdog execution, and updater activity. Attack Chain Figure 1. Overview of the attack chain. Initial access via fake download lures The campaign begins when users download and run fake installers promoted as cracked software, game installers, executors, activators, plugins, utilities, or driver and mobile-unlock tools. Observed lures include cracked audio plugins, PC games, Roblox executors, auto-clickers, driver tools, and fake utility installers. Example lures: Echo Client; FabFilter Total Bundle; Navicat Premium crack; Cue Club; auto-clicker; Deadpool Apunka Games; Command & Conquer: Red Alert 2; TFT Unlock Tool; and clownfishvoicechanger. Figure 2. Example utility download lure. Inno wrapper execution and temporary runner staging Across the investigated activity, user-launched lures spawned Inno Setup-style temporary runners under %TEMP%\is-*.tmp\ and then launched one or more numbered eld*.exe stages. Arguments such as /SL5, /SPAWNWND, a

Read the original at microsoft.com

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

Applicable to Defender, Teams / SharePoint. Nobody has published exploitation yet, so this belongs in the next planned change window rather than tonight.

Publisher text. (IOCs) Microsoft Threat Intelligence detected approximately 7.3 billion email-based phishing threats from July through September, including a sharp increase to nearly 3 billion in September alone, up 41% from August. Yet the increase did not extend across the techniques that had driven threat actor activity earlier in the year. QR code phishing remained far below its early-year peak, while CAPTCHA-gated phishing reversed several months of decline, driven in part by renewed use of SVG attachments. Q2 in review Shifting tactics and other trends › Figure 1. Monthly detected email threat volume (January – September 2026) The quarter also highlighted how sender identity and security exceptions can shape the outcome of detected threats. Microsoft detected approximately 129 million malicious messages spoofing the sender domains of tracked business services. Many were delivered because organization- or user-configured exceptions overrode security protections, even after the messages failed authentication checks and were identified as malicious, showing how overly broad exceptions intended to preserve legitimate workflows can also expose them to impersonation. In Microsoft Teams, attackers increasingly used ordinary personal names rather than explicit help desk identities while continuing to use live interactions for social engineering. Across malicious attachment activity more broadly, credential theft remained the dominant objective in Q3. Two campaigns observed during the quarter illustrate the range of activity behind these trends. An August campaign targeting legal organizations used personalized salary review documents and QR codes to lead recipients into device code phishing, despite the broader decline in QR code attacks. In September, purchase order and payroll lures used disguised archives to deliver Agent Tesla, malware commonly used to collect credentials and other information. Together, the campaigns show how familiar business requests remained effective lures across distinct attack paths. TYCOON2FA Inside the PhaaS platform › The effects of the March disruption of the Tycoon2FA phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform also remained evident. By July, Microsoft detected approximately 21,000 phishing messages linked to the platform, down 99.8% from 8.9 million in February, the last full month before the operation. Figure 2. Tycoon2FA-linked phishing email volume (January 2026 – July 2026) This blog provides a view of email threat activity across Q3 2026, examining shifts in phishing techniques, malicious payloads, business contact impersonation (BCI), and Teams-based threats. We also highlight spoofed business-service sender domains and two campaigns that show how attackers used familiar work requests to make malicious messages appear credible. Together with recommendations, Microsoft Defender detections, and hunting queries, these findings can help defenders assess where existing protections may be weakened and investigate activity across email and collaboration platforms. Spoofed sender domains Requests to sign a document, review an invoice, or respond to a survey are routine business communications. Attackers exploit that familiarity by spoofing the sender domains of the legitimate services that deliver them. Rather than relying only on a misleading display name or a lookalike domain, these messages claim the service’s actual domain as their sender identity. Microsoft detected approximately 129 million malicious messages spoofing the business-service domains tracked in this analysis during Q3. Activity had remained consistently high since at least May, at roughly 41 million to 46 million messages a month. DocuSign was the most frequently spoofed brand in September, accounting for 29% of that month’s total. Adobe, SurveyMo

Read the original at microsoft.com

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

Applicable to Entra ID, Defender, Intune. Nobody has published exploitation yet, so this belongs in the next planned change window rather than tonight.

Publisher text. Endpoint administrators need to keep elevated access accountable at scale. Security teams also need a clearer view of expert-led protection and a simpler way to deploy SQL Server protection in Azure Government. As AI agents gain access to business data and tools, organizations need ways to limit their authority and adapt protection as risk changes. This month’s Microsoft Intune and Microsoft Defender updates introduce capabilities across these areas, alongside new Secure AI capabilities for agent access. A recent Secure Now update in Microsoft Security Exposure Management also connects information on recent threats to focused initiatives for reducing exposure. Here’s what’s new: Limit agent authority to the task with Dynamic Permissions Give agents task-scoped authority and adapt access as risk changes As agents gain access to business data and tools, organizations need ways to manage what each agent is allowed to do. Dynamic Permissions provides an agent its own permissions and authority, scoped to its current task and for only as long as the task requires. As the agent works, Dynamic Agent Risk assesses whether the agent’s authority aligns with changing behavior and context. Dynamic Conditional Access can then respond proportionately by narrowing permissions, restricting access to resources, or requiring human approval for higher-impact actions. Together, these capabilities are designed to help organizations tailor agent authority before an agent acts and adjust access as risk changes. See how security can respond when an agent steps outside its task. Contain local AI agents with Microsoft Execution Containers Apply least-privilege boundaries to help limit access on Windows Microsoft Execution Containers (MXC), now generally available, gives organizations an operating system-enforced containment layer for AI agents, designed to limit what an agent can access. Rather than relying on the agent to behave within intended boundaries, MXC applies least-privilege controls across files, networks, processes, and user interactions, with additional isolation options for higher-risk scenarios. Organizations can tune and validate policies before enforcing them broadly, while upcoming integration with Microsoft Intune, Microsoft Entra, and Microsoft Agent 365 is intended to extend governance and attribution across the enterprise. Discover more about this policy-driven containment for AI agents. Scale least privilege with Microsoft Intune Endpoint Privilege Management Expand least-privilege scenarios with new system settings support and simpler tenant onboarding Microsoft Intune Endpoint Privilege Management continues to expand the tasks standard users can complete without broad administrator rights. With new system settings support, standard users can change IPv4, IPv6, and DNS server values on their device’s network adapters through Endpoint Privilege Management, while administrators determine how those changes are elevated. For user-confirmed changes, administrators can require a business justification, Windows authentication, or both before the change is applied. Along with tenant onboarding updates, these improvements support organizations as they get started with and expand their use of Endpoint Privilege Management. Explore how to get started with system settings support in Endpoint Privilege Management. Get started with Microsoft Intune Endpoint Privilege Management Simplify security operations with Defender Experts See what Defender Experts are investigating in a consolidated experience As threats move faster and security environments grow more complex, security teams need to quickly understand what matters and when to act. New Microsoft Defender Experts MDR experiences in the Microsoft Defender portal bring ongoing expert work into focus with a consolidated overview page with updated navigation and visibility into hunts. Teams can review active and completed hunts, see findings from Defender Experts, and identify items that may require follow-up. Learn more about the new Defender Experts MDR experiences. Get aro

Read the original at microsoft.com

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

Applicable to Exchange, Teams / SharePoint. Nobody has published exploitation yet, so this belongs in the next planned change window rather than tonight.

Publisher text. On-premises servers can be essential to business operations, but they are increasingly attractive targets to attackers. AI can help less-skilled actors analyze software, develop malicious tools, and repeat attack workflows at greater speed and scale, shortening the window between exposure and exploitation. Organizations need to strengthen security faster without disrupting the critical workloads they rely on. Today, we’re announcing a new on-premises security initiative, initially focused on server workloads. The initiative brings together guidance, migration, and product investments to help customers understand and prioritize risk, reduce their on-premises footprint wherever possible, and strengthen critical workloads that need to remain. Guidance for the initiative will soon be available through Secure Now, which also includes our AI readiness checklist in Microsoft Security Exposure Management and guidance for strengthening foundational security. Understand Identify the most important on-premises risks and prioritize actions customers can take now. Reduce Move workloads to Microsoft 365 where possible to take advantage of cloud-based security, resilience, and continuous innovation. Secure Strengthen critical workloads that need to remain on-premises and reduce the manual work required to keep them secure. This approach starts with understanding where to focus—and extends to making supported on-premises products more secure by default. Modernize where you can, and strengthen the security of what must remain. Making supported on-premises workloads more secure by default Within the Secure pillar of the on-premises security initiative, we’re also hardening the products themselves through On-Premises Baseline Security Mode, starting with supported Exchange Server, SharePoint Server, and Skype for Business Server workloads. On-Premises Baseline Security Mode On-Premises Baseline Security Mode is designed to make the default security posture stronger—reducing the number of recommended security settings administrators must configure and maintain manually. For supported on-premises server workloads, it starts with a validated and tested secure-by-default configuration from initial deployment, while preserving administrator control. Building on protections available today, it progressively establishes and maintains more of the recommended security posture through the products themselves, adapting the baseline as threats and Microsoft security guidance evolve. The result is less manual effort and a stronger security posture maintained increasingly through the products themselves. We’re advancing this work across three areas: Patch, Configure, and Protect. Figure 1: On-Premises Baseline Security Mode builds on capabilities available today across Patch, Configure, and Protect, with greater automation and stronger defaults coming over time. Patch: close known vulnerabilities faster The need is clear in our deployment data: many Exchange Server deployments are not running the current security update, including a substantial share on unsupported versions. Closing this protection gap requires both releasing fixes faster and helping customers apply them sooner. Today. Since September 2026, Microsoft has released not only Critical but also Important security updates outside the traditional Patch Tuesday schedule when faster action is needed, helping customers address known vulnerabilities sooner. Next. In Q1 calendar year 2027, we’re targeting automatic application of security updates after a fixed period following release in connected SharePoint Server, Exchange Server, and Skype for Business Server environments. Release fixes faster, then help those fixes reach servers faster. Configure: make the safer posture easier to maintain Security requires more than current software. Configuration and permissions can drift over time, creating gaps between the intended security posture and the environment administrators are operating. Customers need a clearer way to identify those gaps, establish recommended settings, and maintain them as enviro

Read the original at techcommunity.microsoft.com

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

Applicable to Exchange. Nobody has published exploitation yet, so this belongs in the next planned change window rather than tonight.

Publisher text. The Russian state-backed threat group Turla has been using a new malicious toolset called 'Cereal' to intercept emails on Microsoft Exchange servers at government organizations. [...]

Read the original at bleepingcomputer.com

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

Applicable to Exchange. Nobody has published exploitation yet, so this belongs in the next planned change window rather than tonight.

Publisher text. The Russia-aligned state-sponsored threat actor known as Turla (aka Snake) is wielding a previously undocumented cyber espionage toolset called Cereal that's used to break into victims' Microsoft Exchange servers with an aim to surreptitiously collect emails. According to an ESET report shared with The Hacker News ahead of publication, the sophisticated and modular tool is designed for

Read the original at thehackernews.com

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.

Applicable to Teams / SharePoint. Nobody has published exploitation yet, so this belongs in the next planned change window rather than tonight.

Publisher text. The Good | Global Authorities Dismantle Investment Scams & VasyGrek Infrastructure, Indict University System HackersLaw enforcement in Europe, supported by Europol and Eurojust, arrested seven suspects and seized over 100 servers targeting a crime-as-a-service (CaaS) investment fraud infrastructure. Operating from Cyprus and Israel, an unnamed vendor supplied fraudulent trading websites to criminal call centers across Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and more. Following a four-year investigation initiated after victims reported missing funds, investigators linked the infrastructure to fake foreign currency, stock, and cryptocurrency schemes affecting victims in at least 50 countries. Scammers used fake online account profits to coerce larger transfers before cutting contact, leaving victims unable to recover their funds.In the U.S., a federal grand jury indicted two Canadian nationals, Ryan James Roach and Mathiew James Stubbings, for conspiring to breach multiple American universities to mine for cryptocurrency. Between June 2016 and December 2019, the co-conspirators deployed virtual private servers to infect academic networks across Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, and Tennessee with malware. Once inside, the defendants stole user log-ins and data, deployed cryptocurrency mining software, and hijacked high-performance campus supercomputers to conduct unauthorized network vulnerability research. Both men face up to ten years in prison and $250,000 fines following formal extradition proceedings from Canada.Russian law enforcement authorities arrested three suspected members of the VasyGrek threat group (aka Fluffy Wolf) and dismantled its operational infrastructure. Active since 2016, the financially-motivated group was known for targeting organizations across metallurgy, energy, healthcare, and finance sectors in Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Attackers would send phishing emails with malicious accounting attachments to drop remote access trojans and steal corporate funds. Police seized computer equipment and server assets after uncovering a broad network of fake financial domains, dark web remote administration tools, and Golang backdoors used to execute unauthorized commands.The Bad | Impersonators Abuse Microsoft Teams and Active Directory Certificate ServicesAccording to a new report, threat actors have been posing as IT help desk staff on Microsoft Teams to message and call corporate employees and leverage external support-themed tenants to trick users into handing over workstation access. Once connected, attackers instructed victims to launch Quick Assist, a built-in Windows remote-help tool, and read back connection codes to grant full remote desktop control. The intruders then dropped malicious software archives into Downloads folders, unpacking and executing payloads via portable Python, Bun, or Java runtimes disguised as legitimate Windows system updates.After establishing initial persistence, the attackers abused weak configuration templates within Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) to request digital authentication certificates for privileged domain accounts. In one documented intrusion, threat actors exploited an ESC1 misconfiguration to obtain certificates for three highly privileged identities—access that persisted even after password resets or workstation wipes. The attacker used one of those certificates to compromise a domain controller, execute DCSync credential dumping, and exfiltrate internal corporate files to an external server via Rclone.In a second intrusion, attackers targeted an ESC8 configuration by deploying the ‘PetitPotam’ technique to force a domain controller to authenticate against an attacker-controlled endpoint. The relayed NTLM authentication allowed the actors to request a certificate directly for the domain controller without credentials, securing a persistent Kerberos ticket-granting ticket. The customer isolated the affected workstation, and no further attack progression was observed.Because these intrusions exploit misconfigured certificate enrollment

Read the original at sentinelone.com

Exposure and response are Digest interpretation of the vulnerability class, not claims made by the publisher. Confirm against the source before acting.